Xi Jinping succeeded Hu Jintao as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2012, and later in 2016 was proclaimed the CCP's fourth leadership core, following Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin.
Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as the Core 以习近平同志为核心的党中央 | |
|---|---|
5th generation Communist leadership of the People's Republic of China | |
| Incumbent | |
Xi Jinping in 2025 | |
| Date formed | 15 November 2012 |
| People and organisations | |
| Head of state | Xi Jinping |
| Head of government | Li Keqiang Li Qiang |
| No. of ministers | 31 |
| Member party | Chinese Communist Party Eight minor parties |
| History | |
| Elections | 18th Congress in November 2012 19th Congress in October 2017 20th Congress in October 2022 |
| Legislature terms | 12th National People's Congress 13th National People's Congress 14th National People's Congress |
| Predecessor | Hu Jintao Administration/ Xi–Li Administration |
| General secretaryship of Xi Jinping | |||||||||||
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| Simplified Chinese | 习近平体制 | ||||||||||
| Traditional Chinese | 習近平體制 | ||||||||||
| Literal meaning | Xi Jinping System | ||||||||||
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| Alternative Chinese name | |||||||||||
| Simplified Chinese | 以习近平同志为核心的党中央 | ||||||||||
| Traditional Chinese | 以習近平同志為核心的黨中央 | ||||||||||
| Literal meaning | The Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as the Core | ||||||||||
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| Second alternative Chinese name | |||||||||||
| Simplified Chinese | 以习近平同志为总书记的党中央 | ||||||||||
| Traditional Chinese | 以習近平同志為總書記的黨中央 | ||||||||||
| Literal meaning | The Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as the General Secretary | ||||||||||
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While overseeing China's domestic policy, Xi has introduced far-ranging measures to enforce party discipline and strengthen internal unity. His anti-corruption campaign led to the downfall of prominent incumbent and retired CCP officials, including former PSC member Zhou Yongkang. For the sake of promoting "common prosperity", Xi has enacted a series of policies designed to increase equality, overseen targeted poverty alleviation programs as part of the battle against poverty, and directed a broad crackdown in 2021 against the tech sector, as well as drastically curtailing the tutoring industry and reducing homework burdens. Furthermore, he has expanded support for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), emphasized advanced manufacturing and tech development, advanced military-civil fusion, and led attempts to reform China's property sector. Following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in mainland China, he initially presided over a zero-COVID policy from January 2020 to December 2022 before ultimately shifting towards a mitigation strategy after COVID-19 protests occurred. In foreign policy, Xi emphasizes the Community of Common Destiny. He seeks to increase China's ability to shape international norms in emerging policy areas (described as "new frontiers") like space and the internet, where China can position itself as an early entrant. Xi also seeks to increase China's discourse power, which he frames as China's "right to speak." Xi has pursued a more hardline foreign policy particularly with regard to China's relations with the United States, the nine-dash line in the South China Sea, and the Sino-Indian border dispute. Additionally, for the sake of advancing Chinese economic interests abroad, Xi has sought to expand China's influence in Africa and Eurasia by championing the Belt and Road Initiative.
Xi presided over a deterioration in relations between Beijing and Taipei under Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen, successor of Ma Ying-jeou whom Xi met in 2015. In 2020, Xi oversaw the passage of a national security law in Hong Kong, which clamped down on political opposition in the city, especially pro-democracy activists. Since coming to power, Xi's tenure has witnessed a significant increase in censorship and mass surveillance, a deterioration in human rights (including the persecution of Uyghurs), the rise of a cult of personality, the removal of term limits for the presidency in 2018, as well as an increased role for the CCP in society. Xi's political ideas and principles, known as Xi Jinping Thought, have been incorporated into the party and national constitutions. As the central figure of the fifth generation of leadership of the PRC, Xi has centralized institutional power by taking on multiple positions, overseen significant reforms of Party, state and military bodies, while also increasing CCP's influence over the state bodies. In October 2022, Xi secured a third term as CCP General Secretary, and was re-elected state president for an unprecedented third term in March 2023.
Economic policies
Xi Jinping has set three overarching goals for China's economy.: 10 First, to increase China's capacity for innovation so that it will be able to more actively shape global economic rules.: 10 Second, to enhance order and security in China's domestic market.: 10 Third, creating common prosperity and increasing wealth distribution to the poor.: 10
During the Xi Jinping era, the Chinese government continues to use state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to serve non-market objectives and CCP control of SOEs has increased: 138 while taking some limited steps towards market liberalization, such as increasing mixed ownership of SOEs.: 141 Although China has promoted its national champion companies since the Jiang Zemin administration,: 158 it has done so particularly strongly since 2017, especially in the technology sector.: 91
Since 2015, the CCP has issued several industrial plans designed to emphasize high-tech innovation and digital development.: 135 These industrial plans include Made in China 2025, the "Action Outline for Promoting the Development of Big Data", and the "Three-Year Action Plan to Promote the Development of a New Generation of Artificial Intelligence Industry".: 135 China's Thirteenth and Fourteenth Five-Year Plans have also emphasized high-tech and innovative development.: 135
During the Xi Jinping administration, China has emphasized an economic strategy of dual circulation.: 170 First, it seeks to rely more on China's domestic consumers.: 160 Second, it seeks to innovate more domestically developed technology and thereby reduce China's reliance on western technology.: 160
By 2020, China became the largest trading partner of more than 120 countries.: 228 At the end of that year, China signed major free trade agreements with the European Union as well as fifteen different Asia-Pacific countries.: 259 As of at least 2023, China is the world's largest exporter, a status it has maintained continuously since 2010.: 88
China's was the only major world economy to experience GDP growth in 2020, when its GDP increased by 2.3%. In 2021, China's GDP growth reached 8.1% (its highest in a decade) and its trade surplus reached an all-time high $687.5 billion.
Education
Xi has implemented a number of education reforms.: 155 Schools are required to adjust their opening hours to be consistent with work hours in their area so that parents can pick-up their children directly after work (in order to reduce reliance on private classes for adult supervision after school hours).: 155 Schools must also promote health by requiring outdoor physical education classes daily and providing eye examinations twice per term.: 155 Educational reforms have also limited the amount of homework students can be assigned.: 156
As part of Xi's 2021 directive on "double lessening" (reducing excessive off-campus tutoring and reducing homework burdens), schools may not assign homework to children to grades one and two, homework is limited to no more than 60 minutes for children in grades three to six, and no more than 90 minutes for middle school children.: 156 In July 2021, China enacted a series of rules designed to shutdown the private tutoring sector.: 156
The government's rationale was that rising educational costs were antithetical to the goals of common prosperity.: 67 Shutting down private tutoring was intended to narrow the education gap between rich and poor.: 5 Rules issued in July 2021 prohibits new registration of private tuition tutoring centers and required existing centers to re-organize as non-profits.: 156 Tuition centers are prohibited from being listed on the stock market or receiving "excessive capital.": 156 They are no longer permitted to offer tutoring on the weekends or during public holidays.: 156
Since September 2021, private schools providing compulsory education can no longer be controlled by foreign entities or individuals.: 57 Only Chinese nationals may serve on their boards of directors.: 157
Foreign policy
During the Xi Jinping administration, China seeks to shape international norms and rules in emerging policy areas where China has an advantage as an early participant.: 188 Xi describes such areas as "new frontiers," and they include policy areas such as space, deep sea, polar regions, the Internet, nuclear safety, anticorruption, and climate change.: 188
In his effort to build additional institutional capacity for foreign policy coordination, Xi Jinping created the National Security Commission (NSC), which absorbed the NSLG.: 180 The NSC's focus is holistic national security and it addresses both external and internal security matters.: 180 Xi introduced the holistic security concept in 2014, which he defined as taking "the security of the people as compass, political security as its roots, economic security as its pillar, military security, cultural security, and cultural security as its protections, and that relies on the promotion of international security.": 3
During the Xi Jinping era, the Community of Common Destiny has become China's most important foreign relations formulation.: 6 In his foreign policy discourse, Xi cites the examples of "foreign friends of China" to acknowledge other countries' sacrifices to assist in China's national liberation, particularly with regard to the Second Sino-Japanese war.: 42 For example, during diplomatic visits to other countries, Xi has praised the contributions of people like Claire Lee Chennault, Norman Bethune, Dawarkanath Kotnis, and Soviet pilots.: 42
Xi emphasizes his desire to increase China's discourse power in international matters, often characterizing this in terms of China's "right to speak".: 103
During Xi's administration, China has often extended state-backed loans for energy and infrastructure-building in exchange for natural resources in regions like Central Asia and Africa.: 87
Ideology
"Xi Jinping Thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era" was formally launched at the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party having gradually been developed since 2012, when Xi became General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party.: 21–26
In his political discourse, Xi incorporates historical examples and themes.: 32 He describes history as "the best teacher" and "the best textbook".: 32 Especially since the COVID-19 pandemic, Xi encourages the Chinese people to develop "historical self-confidence".: 32 Xi includes ancient history in his political discourse, characterizing China as a "splendid civilization" and highlighting its five thousand years of history.: 33 He often cites the Four Great Inventions as a source of national pride and China's contribution to humanity.: 33 In his discourse for foreign audiences regarding China's peaceful rise, Xi quotes the Confucian saying, "If you do not want to have it yourself, you should not want to impose it on others.": 64 In his discourse on the community of shared future, Xi cites the third century scholar Chen Shou's saying that "delicious soup is made by combining different ingredients.": 64
Anti-corruption
A far-reaching anti-corruption campaign was launched in China following the conclusion of the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2012. Initiated by CCP general secretary Xi Jinping, the campaign became the most extensive and systematic anti-corruption effort in the history of CCP governance. The campaign began with the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) conducting investigations into numerous high-ranking CCP and government officials, as well as People's Liberation Army (PLA) generals and heads of state-owned enterprises and institutions, for violations of discipline and law. Nationwide, disciplinary inspection and supervision departments at all levels of the CCP and government have investigated and punished CCP members and senior officials for violations of discipline and law.
Upon assuming office, Xi Jinping pledged to crack down on both "tigers and flies", referring respectively to high-ranking officials and grassroots civil servants. Most of the officials investigated were dismissed from office and faced charges of bribery and abuse of power, though the severity and nature of the alleged misconduct varied considerably. Administered primarily by the CCDI its Secretary from 2012 to 2017, Wang Qishan, alongside the relevant military and judicial bodies, the campaign has targeted hundreds of senior officials, including dozens of ministerial-level official and senior PLA officers, hundreds of deputy ministerial-level officials, several executives of state-owned enterprises, and five national leaders.
The campaign notably investigated both sitting and former national-level leaders. These included former Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) member Zhou Yongkang and former Politburo members and Central Military Commission (CMC) vice chairmen Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong. The campaign also targeted sitting Politburo members such as Chongqing Party secretary Sun Zhengcai in 2017, and CMC vice chairmen He Weidong and Zhang Youxia in 2025 and 2026 respectively. As of 2023, approximately 2.3 million government officials had been prosecuted. The campaign formed a central component of a broader initiative aimed at curbing corruption within the CCP and reinforcing internal unity. It has since become one of the defining features of Xi's political legacy.
Military reform
Reform of China's defense and military structure began after Xi Jinping became the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chairman of the Central Military Commission in 2012. Under Xi's administration, China created the CCP National Security Commission and established an air defense identification zone in the East China Sea in 2013. In 2014, Xi told the CCP Politburo that the PLA should operate by integrating multiple services.
In January 2014, Chinese senior military officers[who?] said that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) was planning to reduce the number of military regions from seven to five Theater Commands to have joint command with the ground, naval, air and rocket forces. This is planned to change their concept of operations from primarily ground-oriented defense to mobile and coordinated movements of all services and to enhance offensive air and naval capabilities. The coastal areas would be turned into three military regions, each with a joint operations command (Jinan, Nanjing and Guangzhou) for projecting power into the Yellow Sea, East China Sea and South China Sea. The four other inland military regions (Shenyang, Beijing, Chengdu and Lanzhou) will be streamlined into two military areas mainly for organizing forces for operations. The change was projected to occur through 2019.
Xi announced a reduction of 300,000 troops from the PLA in September 2015, bringing its size to 2 million troops. Xi described this as a gesture of peace, while analysts such as Rory Medcalf have said that the cut was done to reduce costs as well as part of PLA's modernization. Around half of the 300,000 troops were officers, and most were from the People's Liberation Army Ground Force. The "deepening national defense and military reform" was announced in November 2015 at a plenary session of the Central Military Commission (CMC)'s Central Leading Group for Military Reform. They were expected to be long and extensive that aimed at turning the PLA into a modern military on par with international standards. Before the reforms were announced, Xi said the CMC should directly control the military and new regional commands be created. On 1 January 2016, the CMC issued its "Deepening National Defense and Military Reform" document, which called for major restructuring of the military with the goal of modernizing and enhancing the military's operational capabilities.: 288
Religion
Religious sinicization (from "sinicize", meaning somebody or something modified under Chinese influence) usually refers to "the indigenisation of religious faith, practice, and ritual in Chinese culture and society". Since Xi Jinping took office as the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012, the officially atheist Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has tightened restrictions on religion in the People's Republic of China.
The party's attitude towards religion dates back to the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, when early CCP leaders viewed religion as a potential threat, associating it with foreign influence, feudalism, and superstition. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), CCP Chairman Mao Zedong took measures to eliminate religion, which led to the widespread destruction of religious sites and persecution of believers. Under Deng Xiaoping, the CCP shifted to a regulatory policy, aimed at managing religion and using its influence to achieve other party objectives, as well as to suppress any threat it might present to the party's authority.[page needed] Given the apparent expansion of religion in Chinese society in recent decades, CCP leaders have responded with a combination of regulations and repression.[page needed]
The Xi general secretaryship has broadly followed a similar approach to religion and continued policies initiated by its predecessors.[page needed] However, religious policy under Xi Jinping can be distinguished from that of the Hu Jintao era in four key ways: a set of new, more restrictive legal instruments has been introduced, religious persecution targets have broadened, there is increased state interference in daily religious practices, and there are new forms of technological surveillance.[page needed]
In May 2015, sinicization entered the official discourse when Xi Jinping declared, at the Central United Front Work Conference, that religion in China should be adapted to align with socialist values and must adhere to the path of sinicization. The theme of religious sinicization has grown more prominent in official discourse. He further emphasized his strategy of religious Sinicisation in a speech in 2016. This was followed up in 2018 by the National People's Congress and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) approving the administrative, ideological, and legal frameworks for the policy of Sinicisation, with these measures coming into force on the 1st of February 2020.
The CCP's policy is an attempt to bring religions under state control and align them with Chinese culture. The campaign particularly affects religions deemed 'foreign', such as Christianity and Islam. Xi Jinping perceives these religions as susceptible to 'Western values' and extremism, which he considers to be a threat to his ruling objectives.
The religious sinicization policy has three main focuses for the CCP to monitor and manage religion in China: bureaucratically, the CCP streamlines oversight of religion; ideologically, it reinforces Party influence over religious beliefs and practices; and legally, it provides the juridical framework to monitor and control the growth of religion and its influence in China. Religious Sinicization requires patriotic education and public displays of loyalty to the CCP in churches, mosques, and temples. The leaders of Christianity and Islam are expected to "align their teachings and customs with Chinese traditions and 'pledge loyalty' to the state". Thus, rather than adapting religion to Chinese culture and traditions, it is about making religions subservient to CCP ideology.
Human rights
According to the Human Rights Watch, Xi has "started a broad and sustained offensive on human rights" since he became leader in 2012. The HRW also said that repression in China is "at its worst level since the Tiananmen Square massacre." Since taking power, Xi has cracked down on grassroots activism, with hundreds being detained. He presided over the 709 crackdown on 9 July 2015, which saw more than 200 lawyers, legal assistants and human rights activists being detained. His term has seen the arrest and imprisonment of activists such as Xu Zhiyong, as well as numerous others who identified with the New Citizens' Movement. Prominent legal activist Pu Zhiqiang of the Weiquan movement was also arrested and detained.
In 2017, the local government of the Jiangxi province told Christians to replace their pictures of Jesus with Xi Jinping as part of a general campaign on unofficial churches in the country. According to local social media, officials "transformed them from believing in religion to believing in the party." According to activists, "Xi is waging the most severe systematic suppression of Christianity in the country since religious freedom was written into the Chinese constitution in 1982," and according to pastors and a group that monitors religion in China, has involved "destroying crosses, burning bibles, shutting churches and ordering followers to sign papers renouncing their faith."
Ethnic minorities
Under Xi, the CCP has embraced assimilationist policies towards ethnic minorities, scaling back affirmative action in the country by 2019, and scrapping a wording in October 2021 that guaranteed the rights of minority children to be educated in their native language, replacing it with one that emphasized teaching the national language. In 2014, Xi called to foster a sense of community for the Chinese nation among ethnic minorities. In 2020, Chen Xiaojiang was appointed as head of the National Ethnic Affairs Commission, the first Han Chinese head of the body since 1954. On 24 June 2022, Pan Yue, another Han Chinese, became the head of the commission, with him reportedly holding assimilationist policies toward ethnic minorities. Xi outlined his official views relations between the majority Han Chinese and ethnic minorities by saying "[n]either Han chauvinism nor local ethnic chauvinism is conducive to the development of a community for the Chinese nation."
Xinjiang
There were several terrorist attacks in Xinjiang in 2013 and 2014; an attack in Ürümqi in April 2014 occurred just after the conclusion of a visit by Xi Jinping to Xinjiang. Following these attacks, CCP leaders held a secret meeting to find a solution to the attacks, leading to Xi to launch the Strike Hard Campaign Against Violent Terrorism in 2014, which involved mass detention, and surveillance of ethnic Uyghurs there. The campaign included the detainment of 1.8 million people in internment camps, mostly Uyghurs but also including other ethnic and religious minorities, by 2020, and a birth suppression campaign that led to a large drop in the Uyghur birth rate by 2019. Human rights groups and former inmates have described the camps as "concentration camps", where Uyghurs and other minorities have been forcibly assimilated into China's majority ethnic Han society. This program has been called a genocide by some observers, while a report by the UN Human Rights Office said they may amount to crimes against humanity.
Internal Chinese government documents leaked to the press in November 2019 showed that Xi personally ordered a security crackdown in Xinjiang, saying that the party must show "absolutely no mercy" and that officials use all the "weapons of the people's democratic dictatorship" to suppress those "infected with the virus of extremism." The papers also showed that Xi repeatedly discussed about Islamic extremism in his speeches, likening it to a "virus" or a "drug" that could be only addressed by "a period of painful, interventionary treatment." However, he also warned against the discrimination against Uyghurs and rejected proposals to eradicate Islam in China, calling that kind of viewpoint "biased, even wrong." Xi's exact role in the building of internment camps has not been publicly reported, though he's widely believed to be behind them and his words have been the source for major justifications in the crackdown in Xinjiang.
During a four-day visit to Xinjiang in July 2022, Xi urged local officials to always listen to the people's voices and to do more in preservation of ethnic minority culture. He also inspected the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps and praised its "great progress" in reform and development. During another visit to Xinjiang in August 2023, Xi said in a speech that the region was "no longer a remote area" and should open up more for tourism to attract domestic and foreign visitors.
Current members
Standing Committee
| R. | Officeholder | 19th | Birth | PM | Birthplace | Academic feats | Positions | Ref. | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Xi Jinping | 习近平 | Old | 1953 | 1974 | Beijing | Graduate
| Twelve
| ||
| 2 | Li Qiang | 李强 | New | 1959 | 1983 | Zhejiang | Graduate
| Fifteen
| ||
| 3 | Zhao Leji | 赵乐际 | Old | 1957 | 1975 | Qinghai | Graduate
| Four
| ||
| 4 | Wang Huning | 王沪宁 | Old | 1955 | 1984 | Shanghai | Graduate
| Eight
| ||
| 5 | Cai Qi | 蔡奇 | New | 1955 | 1975 | Fujian | Graduate
| Fifteen
| ||
| 6 | Ding Xuexiang | 丁薛祥 | New | 1962 | 1984 | Jiangsu | Graduate
| Thirteen
| ||
| 7 | Li Xi | 李希 | New | 1956 | 1982 | Gansu | Graduate
| Four
| ||
Politburo
| Officeholder | 19th | Birth | PM | Birthplace | Education | Offices held | Ref. | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cai Qi | 蔡奇 | Old | 1955 | 1975 | Fujian | Graduate | Three
| ||
| Chen Jining | 陈吉宁 | New | 1964 | 1984 | Liaoning | Graduate | One
| ||
| Chen Min'er | 陈敏尔 | Old | 1960 | 1982 | Zhejiang | Graduate | One
| ||
| Chen Wenqing | 陈文清 | New | 1960 | 1983 | Sichuan | Graduate | One
| ||
| Ding Xuexiang | 丁薛祥 | Old | 1962 | 1984 | Jiangsu | Graduate | One
| ||
| He Lifeng | 何立峰 | New | 1955 | 1981 | Guangdong | Graduate | Two
| ||
| He Weidong | 何卫东 | New | 1957 | 1978 | Fujian | Undergraduate | Two
| ||
| Huang Kunming | 黄坤明 | Old | 1956 | 1976 | Fujian | Graduate | One
| ||
| Li Ganjie | 李干杰 | New | 1964 | 1984 | Hunan | Graduate | One
| ||
| Li Hongzhong | 李鸿忠 | Old | 1956 | 1976 | Shenyang | Graduate | One
| ||
| Li Qiang | 李强 | Old | 1959 | 1983 | Zhejiang | Graduate | Eight
| ||
| Li Shulei | 李书磊 | New | 1964 | 1986 | Henan | Graduate | One
| ||
| Li Xi | 李希 | Old | 1956 | 1982 | Gansu | Graduate | Two
| ||
| Liu Guozhong | 刘国中 | New | 1962 | 1986 | Heilongjiang | Graduate | One
| ||
| Ma Xingrui | 马兴瑞 | New | 1959 | 1988 | Heilongjiang | Graduate | One
| ||
| Shi Taifeng | 石泰峰 | New | 1956 | 1982 | Shanxi | Graduate | Two
| ||
| Wang Huning | 王沪宁 | Old | 1955 | 1984 | Shanghai | Graduate | One
| ||
| Wang Yi | 王毅 | New | 1953 | 1981 | Beijing | Graduate | Two
| ||
| Xi Jinping | 习近平 | Old | 1953 | 1974 | Beijing | Graduate | Eleven
| ||
| Yin Li | 尹力 | New | 1962 | 1980 | Shandong | Graduate | One
| ||
| Yuan Jiajun | 袁家军 | New | 1962 | 1992 | Jilin | Graduate | One
| ||
| Zhang Guoqing | 张国清 | New | 1964 | 1984 | Henan | Graduate | One
| ||
| Zhang Youxia | 张又侠 | Old | 1950 | 1969 | Beijing | Graduate | Two
| ||
| Zhao Leji | 赵乐际 | Old | 1957 | 1975 | Shandong | Graduate | One
| ||
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