The Greek Constitutional amendment of 1986 was proposed in order to limit the powers of the President of the Republic. It was a political gamble by Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, who suddenly withdrew his backing for Konstantinos Karamanlis' second term and instead promoted his own choice, Christos Sartzetakis. At the same time, Papandreou announced a constitutional revision to remove the powers of the president that acted as checks and balances against an already dominant office of the prime minister.
Eleven articles were amended, primarily targeting the responsibilities of the President of the Republic, transposing the text of the Constitution into demotic Greek, and the removal of the secret ballot for the presidential elections. These amendments transformed the liberal democracy of Greece based on the constitution of 1975 into a 'populist democracy' with a majoritarian parliamentary system and a prime minister acting as a "parliamentary autocrat."
Despite the political and constitutional crisis that emerged in the unconstitutional procedures in electing Sartzetakis as later court rulings concluded, the revised Constitution of 1975/1986 was accepted by all political powers after the polarized 1985 Greek parliamentary election.
Background
First stage
On 6 March 1985, New Democracy announced that they would support Karamanlis' second Presidency term, while on the same day, the KKE party declared that they would put forward their candidate. The press anticipated that Papandreou would also support Karamanlis, since he had assured Karamanlis his support in person. However, Papandreou changed his mind at the last moment, siding with the left wing of PASOK, which did not want Karamanlis, and instead backed Christos Sartzetakis (a Supreme Court of Greece judge known for his principled handling of the 1963 murder of left-wing deputy Grigoris Lambrakis and viewed favorably by the left, and a protagonist in Costas Gavras' 1969 movie "Z" based on the novel of Vassilis Vassilikos). The announcement occurred at the Central Committee of PASOK on 9 March. This move surprised some of Papanderou's ministers, much of his party's rank-and-file, and even Sartzetakis himself, who was not consulted in advance. Later on, it was revealed that the supposedly spontaneous change of mind was to camouflage Papandreou's long-held constitutional designs since Sartzetakis not only knew about it well in advance but also that there had been two other judicial figures who rejected Papandreou's offer. At the same time, Papandreou announced plans for a constitutional reform, which rekindled the debate about the form of the republic and further polarized the political environment by damaging the consensus between the two dominant political parties, PASOK and New Democracy, that existed between 1981 and 1985.
Papandreou also argued that it would be illogical for Karamanlis to preside over any constitutional reform since much of the constitution of 1974 was heavily influenced by Karamanlis himself. Mitsotakis accused Papandreou of creating a constitutional crisis to remove Karamanlis from office to establish a totalitarian constitution. Papandreou informed Karamanlis of his decision via his deputy, Antonios Livanis, as he could not bring himself to do so in person. In response, Karamanlis resigned from the Presidency on 10 March 1985, two weeks before the termination of his term, and was replaced by PASOK's Speaker of the Hellenic Parliament, Ioannis Alevras, as acting president.
Parliamentary votes for president & colored ballots
The presidential vote was conducted by the Hellenic Parliament in a tense and confrontational atmosphere due to constitutionally questionable procedures by Papandreou. Mitsotakis accused Papandreou of violating constitutional principle of secret ballot (Article 32), by forcing his deputies to cast their vote with colored ballots. However, Mitsotakis' concern was dismissed because PASOK controlled the majority in the Parliament. Despite vigorous protests from the opposition, PASOK members used colored ballots under strict surveillance to spot potential defectors. Sartzetakis received 180 votes, which was the minimum stipulated by the constitution, and Alevras, as Speaker of the Parliament, casting the decisive vote. Mitsotakis deemed the vote illegal, with Mitsotakis threatening to remove Sartzetakis from the presidency if they won the upcoming elections, intensifying the constitutional crisis.
Constitutional proposals & debate
In contrast with the constitutional violations raised in Sartzetakis' election, PASOK's procedure in proposing constitutional amendments was under the constitution. However, the surprising announcement of constitutional reform under already tense political conditions and the limited input from constitutional scholars on the nature of amendments increased the possibility of the crisis becoming widespread. Papandreou's proposals were designed to ease future changes to the constitution in Article 110, required amendments to be approved by a parliamentary majority in one rather than two successive parliaments and reducing the powers of the President. While the former proposal was eventually abandoned due to its controversial nature, he was determined to eliminate the presidential powers. His argument was the hypothetical case of an activist president, mimicking the tendency of kings of Greece to intervene in the political life since the creation of the modern Greek state. PASOK minister Anastasios Peponis introduced the constitutional amendment package to the Parliament with the following argument:
Invoking the lack of use of some provisions, their lack of implementation is by no means an argument to keep them in the current constitution. The question is what is our guiding principle? When provisions directly or indirectly contradict the principle of popular sovereignty, we object to them. [...] We support that the president is neither directly appointed by nor elected by the people. We are not a presidential, we are a parliamentary democracy. It is not the president who resorts to the people, so that the people deliver a verdict by majority voting. It is the legitimate government. It is the political parties. If the president resorts to the people, then he inevitably either sides with one party against others or attempts to substitute himself for the parties and impose his own solution. Nevertheless, as soon as he attempts to substitute himself for the parties and impose his own solution, then he embarks upon the formation of his own decisions of governmental nature. Then the government, directly or indirectly, fully or partially, is abolished.
Scholars considered such constitutional changes "unnecessary" since no president had utilized these powers in the course of the Third Hellenic Republic until the time Papandreou raised the issue. Moreover, Anna Benaki-Psarouda, New Democracy's rapporteur, presented in the parliament the following argument against the proposed reforms:
And this is the achievement of the 1975 Constitution: A miraculous balance between the Parliament, the Government and the President of the Republic, namely these state organs which express popular sovereignty and always pose the risk of de facto usurping it. [...] It is also interesting to see where these competencies of the President of the Republic are transferred. They are removed from him, but where do they go? To popular sovereignty and the Parliament, as the parliamentary majority claims? Dear colleagues, all of them go to the government, either directly or indirectly through the parliamentary majority controlled by it. Because the parliament is now subjugated to the parliamentary majority through party discipline. [...] Dear colleagues, the conclusion from the amendments suggested by the government or the parliamentary majority is the following: Power is transferred completely to the government. Hence, we have every reason to be afraid and suspect and mistrust about the future of Greece. [...] I want to stress the following, so that we, the Greek people, understand well: that with the suggested amendments you turn government and government majority into superpowers.
Psarouda-Benaki effectively argued that this type of majoritarianism would damage the quality of Greek democracy. Scholars also noted that the proposed changes would make the prime minister the most powerful ("autocratic") position in the Greek state since there would not be any constitutional restraints.
Aftermath
Polarized elections of 1985
The confrontation from the presidential election continued into the general election campaigns and polarized the Greek society. On one hand Papandreou invoked memories of the Greek Civil War (1946–1949) and Junta (1967–1974) associating New Democracy with the authoritarian Right of the past with the slogan "Vote PASOK to prevent a return of the Right." The communists, persecuted by the Right in the 1950s, protested against Papandreou's dwelling on the past, pointing out that the 1980s were not the same as the 1950s. Papandreou further characterized the upcoming elections as a fight between light and darkness in his rallies, implying that PASOK represented the "forces of light" since its logo was a rising sun. On the other side, Mitsotakis declared, "In voting, the Greek people will also be voting for a president" and also warned that there is a danger of sliding towards an authoritarian one-party state.
In the event, PASOK was re-elected with 45.82% of the vote, losing approximately 2.3% from 1981, while New Democracy increased its share of the vote by 4.98% to 40.84%. Papandreou's gamble worked to his benefit because he gained from far-left voting blocks covering the losses from the centrist voters, and appealed to socialist voters who rejected Karamanlis's perceived hindrance of PASOK's policies. Papandreou had the upper hand over Mitsotakis in which he argued that a vote for Mitsotakis is a vote for a constitutional anomaly, convincing a significant fraction of Greek voters.
After the election results, Mitsotakis accepted Sartzetakis as president and the head of the state. Papandreou's constitutional proposals took effect in 1986.
Court ruling
The case also reached the courts, with the plenary session of the Council of State ruling that the direct judicial review of the election of the President was inadmissible and the Athens One-member Magistrates’ Court ruling in passing that the election of the President was irregular and amounted to an abrogation of popular sovereignty, while it considered that the subsequent political legitimacy (following the victory of PASOK in the 1985 election) did not negate the unconstitutionality of the act.
Scholarly assessment
Scholars generally view the constitutional revision of 1985 as a calculated maneuver aimed at consolidating power and reshaping Greece's democratic institutions, criticized as "unnecessary" and driven by partisan motives rather than genuine institutional reform. Specifically, the constitutional amendments decreased the Constitution's democratic character due to the concentration of power in the prime minister's position along with the emerging statist bureaucracies and technologies aimed at controlling the popular will. It marked a shift from a liberal democracy to a "populist democracy," characterized by a more centralized and populist model of governance.
Analysts outlined different motives behind this move. First, the constitutional revision was a pretext for the removal a respected conservative political figure in the position of head of state that would energize left-wing voters ahead of national elections by reaffirming the PASOK's revolutionary roots. Second, the public discourse was dominated by the nature of constitutional revision and the dubious conduct of presidential election effectively diverted public attention from worsening economic conditions, marked by high inflation, growing trade deficits, and surging unemployment. Third, scholars also opted that Papandreou had long-term constitutional designs to reinforce his government party against an impotent parliament.
Overall, scholars note that the constitutional revision was not a direct threat to democracy, however, it eroded the long-term legitimacy of the constitutional order. Scholars have advocated for strengthening individual rights and institutions as a counterweight to the executive branch led by the prime minister. Other constitutional scholars have suggested partially reversing the removal of presidential powers to mitigate the negative effects of majoritarian politics while avoiding potential conflicts between the president and prime minister.
Sources
Constitutions of Greece
- "Greek Constitution of 1975". Government Gazette (Greece) ΦΕΚ A 111/1975 (in Greek). National Printing Office.
- "Greek Constitution of 1986". Government Gazette (Greece) ΦΕΚ A 23/1986 (in Greek). National Printing Office.
Court decisions
- 2862/1985 Plenary decision (Council of State 1985).
- 84464/1985 Αρχείον Νομολογίας (Magistrate's Court (Μονομελούς Πλημμελειοδικείου Αθηνών) 1985).
Books
- Carabott, Philip; Sfikas, Thanassis D., eds. (2004). The Greek Civil War: essays on a conflict of exceptionalism and silences. Surrey: Ashgate. ISBN 9780754641322.
- Clogg, Richard (1987). Parties and elections in Greece: the search for legitimacy. North Carolina: Duke University Press. ISBN 0822307944.
- ——————, ed. (1993). Greece, 1981–89: The Populist Decade. London & New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 9781349230563.
- Alivizatos, Nikos C. "The Presidency, Parliament and the Courts in the 1980s". In Clogg (1993), pp. 65–77.
- —————— (2013). A Concise History of Greece. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781107656444.
- Featherstone, Kevin; Katsoudas, Dimitrios K., eds. (1987). Political change in Greece: Before and after the colonels. London & New York: Taylor & Francis. ISBN 9781000992144.
- Katsoudas, Dimitrios K. "The Constitutional framework". In Featherstone & Katsoudas (1987), pp. 14–33.
- ——————; Papadimitriou, Dimitris (2015). Prime Ministers in Greece, The Paradox of Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780198717171.
- Featherstone, Kevin; Sotiropoulos, Dimitri A., eds. (2020). The Oxford Handbook of Modern Greek Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0198825104.
- Alivizatos, Nikos C. "Greek constitutionalism and patterns of government". In Featherstone & Sotiropoulos (2020), pp. 103–116.
- Γρηγοριάδης, Ιωάννης N., ed. (2017). Democratic transition and the rise of Populist Majoritarianism: Constitutional Reform in Greece and Turkey. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 9783319575551.
- Grigoriadis, Ioannis N. "The Rising Tide of Populist Majoritarianism in Greece". In Γρηγοριάδης (2017), pp. 14–33.
- Koliopoulos, John S.; Veremis, Thanos M. [in Greek] (2009). Modern Greece A History Since 1821. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. ISBN 9781444314830.
- Manesis, Aristovoulos (1989). Η συνταγματική αναθεώρηση του 1986 [Constitutional resivion of 1986] (in Greek). Athens: Παρατηρητής. ISBN 9789602603543.
- Pappas, Takis (2014). Populism and crisis politics in Greece (in Greek). Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 9781137410580.
- Pridham, Geoffrey, ed. (1990). Securing Democracy, Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe. London & New York: Routledge. ISBN 9780415023269.
- Featherstone, Kevin. "Political Parties and democratic consolidation in Greece". In Pridham (1990), pp. 179–202.
Journals
- Clogg, Richard (1985). "The 1985 Constitutional Crisis in Greece". The Journal of Modern Hellenism. 2 (1): 103–112.
- Kalyvas, Stathis N. (1997). "Polarization in Greek Politics: PASOK's First Four Years, 1981-1985". Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora. 23 (1): 83–104.
- McDonald, Robert (1985). "Greece after PASOK's Victory". The World Today. 41 (7): 133–136. JSTOR 40395748.
- Samatas, Minas (1993). "The Populist Phase of an Underdeveloped Surveillance Society: Political Surveillance in Post-Dictatorial Greece". Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora. 19 (1): 31–70.
Web and other sources
- "Greece's unemployment (%)". International Monetary Fund.
- "Greece's inflation rate (%)". International Monetary Fund.
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